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In American politics, it is common for liberals (and not uncommon for 
conservatives) to advocate imprisoning fewer offenders.1 Advocates of penal 
reform have given many reasons to replace prison with alternative sentences for 
non-violent crimes, in particular: among them, that imprisonment of non-violent 
offenders is a poor use of public resources, compared either with alternative 
punishments or with non-punitive ways of preventing crime (King 2005; Stemen 
2007); that the experience of prison, at least in the United States, often has the 
opposite of a rehabilitative effect (Dolovich 2009); and that there are racial 
disparities in the rates at which non-violent offenders receive sentences of 
imprisonment (Blumstein 1993). Though advocates of penal reform have given 
many reasons our government should not imprison non-violent offenders, they 
typically have not questioned government’s general entitlement to impose 
sentences of imprisonment for a wide range of offenses. Most of the standard 
arguments for penal reform object to incarceration not in the abstract, but in the 
context of contingent facts about the availability of alternative sentences, the 
effects of incarceration, and the ways in which the criminal justice system 
responds unfairly to class and race. 
By contrast, some political philosophers have questioned government’s 
entitlement to impose sentences of imprisonment. These challenges have 
questioned the extent of government’s entitlement to impose punishment of any 
form. Some argue, for instance, that punishment is only justified under specific 
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social circumstances which may not obtain in societies like ours (Hanna 2009). 
Others argue that government has little or no legitimate authority to impose 
obligations that go beyond natural duties, and that government therefore cannot 
legitimately punish most mala prohibita (Nozick 1974; Simmons 1995). These 
broad challenges to government’s authority to punish apply to all forms of 
punishment, not only to imprisonment.
I shall argue that government’s use of imprisonment raises distinctive moral
issues. Even if government has broad authority to make and to enforce law, 
government may not be entitled to use imprisonment as a punishment for all the 
criminal laws it is entitled to make. Indeed, there may be some serious crimes that
it is wrong to punish with imprisonment, even if the conditions of imprisonment 
are humane and even if no adequate alternative punishments are available. The 
moral problem with imprisonment is not that it is more severe than alternatives. 
Imprisonment is scalable in severity. It can be long or brief, and it can be highly 
restrictive or only moderately so. A reasonable person could regard a fine of half 
his life savings as a more severe punishment than a one-year sentence to be 
served in Norway's Bastoy Prison. Prisoners on Bastoy Island all have jobs, but 
they can fish and play tennis in their spare time, they have the keys to their 
rooms, and they have “views of the ocean that are postcard-worthy.” (Sutter 
2012) Imprisonment is distinctive in the way that it affects human agency. Even 
the most lenient forms of imprisonment deprive prisoners of freedom of 
movement. The loss of freedom of movement makes entire categories of human 
activity unavailable in a way that a financial penalty, even a large one, does not. 
The effects of imprisonment on human agency thus differ in kind, not only in 
degree, from the effects of sanctions such as fines and mandatory community 
service. Thus, imprisonment requires special justification, over and above the 
justification of punishment.
The only morally acceptable rationales for incarceration as a punishment, I 
argue, are moral education and collective self-defense. Though retribution may 
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justify punishment of some form, it cannot justify incarceration. Moral education 
justifies imprisonment only if there is evidence that imprisonment does, in fact, 
morally educate. If such evidence is not forthcoming, the only possible 
justification for imprisonment in law enforcement is as a form of collective 
defense against wrongful attacks. Government may be entitled to imprison people
(with due process) to address crimes that attack the necessary conditions for 
citizens’ effective exercise of agency. These include crimes that attack citizens’ 
agency directly, such as crimes of violence. These also include crimes that 
threaten the very existence of the state (e.g. treason), since effective exercise of 
human agency requires at least a minimally effective government. But there is a 
wide range of criminal prohibitions that we are justified in having but that the 
government is not morally entitled to enforce via imprisonment. These include 
many laws against minor offenses, such as disorderly conduct, but they also 
include some laws against offenses that are quite serious. Notably, they include 
prohibitions on white collar crimes such as insider trading that make the market 
less fair or that do small harms to large numbers of people but that do not 
seriously undermine anyone’s effectiveness as an agent.2
The core of my argument is that if we fully understand why it is wrong for 
private individuals to engage in kidnapping, we will see that the moral objection 
to kidnapping applies more widely. Imprisonment by the state is often (but not 
always) wrong in the same way as kidnapping. The account of the wrong of 
kidnapping I offer will build on some of the core claims of Kantian ethics.3 I make 
no apologies for relying on a popular but controversial theoretical framework. 
Others have defended this framework, and I will not attempt to motivate it here. 
Those who are unsympathetic to Kantian ethical theory likely will not find my 
argument congenial. Nonetheless, consequentialists may be pleasantly surprised 
by the conclusion that on the Kantian approach, empirical facts about the effects 
of imprisonment are relevant to its permissibility.
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I. The Value of Freedom of Movement
I shall begin by arguing that imprisonment interferes in a distinctive way with the 
exercise of rational agency. All penalties interfere with some of the things that the
penalized person wants or could want. Fines, for instance, reduce people’s ability 
to do things they want by reducing their financial resources. If imprisonment is 
distinctively problematic, the problem cannot be simply that imprisonment keeps 
people from doing some of the things they want. At the same time, it would be 
absurd to claim that imprisonment keeps people from exercising agency at all. 
Obviously, prisoners do things. Imprisonment of any form is problematic because 
it entirely deprives people of one of the central means of human agency.
Imprisonment takes many forms. Though many prisons are extremely 
unpleasant places, there are some prisons (like Bastoy) that people could 
reasonably find pleasant. Many prisons regulate inmates' activities tightly, but 
others do not. Indeed, people can count as prisoners even if authorities disclaim 
any right to regulate how prisoners spend their time. The only right all prisoners 
are denied is the right to leave the space to which they are confined. Not all 
limitations on freedom of movement are normally characterized as imprisonment.
I shall use the term “imprisonment” to refer to involuntary confinement that 
physically separates people from the rest of society. The word “involuntary” here 
is crucial. People who voluntarily travel on ocean vessels or space ships are 
confined to spaces that are physically separated from the rest of society, but their 
voluntary, temporary confinement enhances their agency by helping them to go 
where they want. Some involuntary limitations on travel, such as house arrest and
the use of ankle monitors, do not physically separate people from society. I leave 
open the question whether these restrictions on movement raise the same ethical 
concerns as imprisonment.
The loss of freedom of movement involved in imprisonment interferes with
the exercise of agency in a distinctive way. Locomotion is a primary means of 
agency for human beings. It is required for any project that requires observing the
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world personally (i.e. not via others’ reports) beyond the tiny corner of the world 
an individual can perceive at a given moment. It is also required for any project 
that involves physically altering the world by one’s own efforts (i.e. not by 
directing others’ efforts) beyond the tiny corner of the world one can reach 
without moving the whole of one’s body. Perhaps most importantly, freedom of 
movement is a prerequisite for effective freedom of association, and thus for the 
ability to select and to pursue projects that require others’ help. The problem here 
is not so much with compelled association—though that is a feature of many 
forms of imprisonment—but with the inability to meet in person with people of 
one’s own choosing. Even if an imprisoned person has unlimited and unmonitored
access to mail, telephone, and electronic communication, and even if visits are 
allowed without restriction, the prisoner cannot meet in person with anyone who 
is unable to make the trip, nor can the prisoner attend meetings of associations. 
Many human projects are either impossible or seriously hampered by the inability 
to meet in person with other participants.
Freedom of movement, then, is one of the basic, all-purpose means of 
human agency. All-purpose means of human agency are means without which 
major categories of human activity are foreclosed. Among the other all-purpose 
means of human agency are the ability to possess and to use physical objects, the 
ability to solicit the help of others, and the ability to draw on our own skills and 
talents.4 Though a person who has lost one of these all-purpose means of agency 
can still live and act, her agency is greatly impaired. Of course, the loss of a 
specific resource, such as a piece of property or a sum of money, can impair 
someone’s agency. But the complete loss of access to one of the basic all-purpose 
means is an impairment of a different kind. Being imprisoned is less like being 
deprived of a specific sum of money and more like being prohibited from using 
money at all.  
One might object that a loss of a specific resource—for instance, a large 
sum of money—might impair someone’s agency more than the loss of freedom of 
5
movement. Admittedly, for some people, losing a large sum of money may 
interfere with their ability to achieve the ends they currently have more than 
losing freedom of movement would. Imagine a solitary miser who is uninterested 
in travel and whose chief pleasures are reading, writing, drawing, and 
contemplating her own wealth. For her to be incarcerated at a prison with a good 
library and an adequate supply of paper and pencils would frustrate her present 
desires less than would the loss of a large part of her financial resources. If she is 
confined more than briefly, however, she will be greatly limited in her ability to 
revise her ends.5 She cannot pursue any projects that require any form of travel, 
and she cannot pursue projects that require forms of association that her 
confinement prevents. By contrast, if she loses a large sum of money, her present 
desires may be frustrated, but the whole category of projects that involve money 
does not become off-limits to her. Imprisonment thus interferes with prisoners' 
effective agency in a serious way, a way that differs in kind from merely 
preventing people from getting things that they want.
II. The Duty to Respect Agency and the Wrong of Kidnapping
So imprisonment affects agency in distinctive ways. But surely sometimes we may 
permissibly restrict people’s agency. The question is when. To determine when it 
is morally acceptable for a government to restrict people’s agency, I will first 
address a different question: why is kidnapping typically wrong? I will offer a 
Kantian answer to this question. If this Kantian account of the wrong of 
kidnapping is sound, it implies that there is a more extensive duty to respect 
freedom of movement.
My Kantian account of the wrong of kidnapping will build on Barbara 
Herman’s Kantian account of the duty to refrain from intentional killing (Herman 
1989). Consider first cases in which one person kills another merely to satisfy a 
desire, such as a desire to get an inheritance sooner. Such killings are obviously 
wrong. What explains the wrongness of such killings? According to the Kantian 
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ethical framework, killing someone merely to satisfy a desire is permissible only if 
people could rationally endorse the universal acceptance of ethical norms that 
permitted such an action. Whether people can rationally endorse universal 
acceptance of norms depends on whether endorsing universal acceptance of these 
norms is consistent with the commitments that reason itself demands. (It is not 
relevant whether the acceptance of these norms would satisfy people’s actual 
desires and preferences.) If I endorsed ethical norms that permitted people to kill 
whenever they take killing to advance their own interests, then I might thereby 
endorse someone killing me, since someone could take it to be in their interest to 
kill me. As a rational agent, if I will anything at all, I am rationally committed to 
my continued existence as a rational agent. So if I will anything at all, I cannot 
rationally endorse ethical norms that permit people to destroy my agency, that is, 
to kill me, whenever doing so would help them to satisfy a mere desire.
A parallel argument explains why it is wrong to kidnap someone merely to 
satisfy a desire. It is obviously wrong to kidnap someone to obtain a ransom or to 
prevent the victim from closing a deal with a business competitor. What makes 
such kidnappings wrong, on the Kantian account? These acts are permissible only 
if one could coherently endorse universal norms that authorized such actions. If I 
endorsed ethical norms that permitted people to kidnap whenever they took 
kidnapping to advance their own interests, then I might thereby endorse someone
kidnapping me. Can I do so coherently? Kidnapping is unlike killing in that it does
not destroy the agency of the victim; it need not involve even a threat of bodily 
harm. So a commitment to my continued existence as a rational agent is at least 
superficially consistent with endorsing others kidnapping me. To explain why 
kidnapping is wrong, on this Kantian framework, it is necessary to explain why 
people are rationally committed to having freedom of movement.
Human beings are rationally and morally committed to preserving their 
freedom of movement because people are morally required to prepare to fulfill 
future moral requirements. These include universal moral duties (such as the duty
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to benefit people in need and the duty to preserve oneself) as well the obligations 
people have acquired (such as promissory obligations and the obligations parents 
have to care for their children). Some things we need to satisfy moral 
requirements are predictable. To preserve oneself, one needs food; to care for 
one’s children, one needs food for them. Other needs are unpredictable. It is not 
always possible to predict what one will have to do to get food for oneself and 
one's children. It is often impossible to predict what one will have to do to be a 
good parent, a good friend, or a good citizen.
To be prepared to fulfill unpredictable future moral requirements, we need 
resources that can be used for many possible purposes. We need broadly-
applicable skills and talents.6 We need the opportunity to ask others’ help.7 We 
need the opportunity to obtain property—i.e., physical resources that we are free 
to use without others’ interference. Because so many possible activities, tasks, and
projects require the ability to move from one place to another, we need freedom 
of movement. Since rationality and morality require us to preserve our access to 
all-purpose means, every human being is rationally and morally committed to 
preserving their freedom of movement.
This does not entail that one is morally required to maximize one’s 
available means. It is not clear what would even count as maximizing one’s 
available means, since increasing the availability of one means almost always 
involves missing out on another. More time studying language means less time 
studying mathematics; pursuing greater financial resources through more hours of
paid labor involves giving up leisure time available for discretionary purposes. 
Rather, rationality and morality prohibit entirely giving up one of the all-purpose 
means of action when there is no compelling reason to do so. One can rationally 
and morally choose not to take the highest-paying job, but one cannot rationally 
or morally vow never to accept income or to own property. One can rationally 
commit never to go to a particular place, but one cannot rationally abandon 
freedom of movement in general. One should not entirely give up an all-purpose 
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means of action because one needs these means available to be able to respond 
flexibly to unpredictable future duties and obligations. Because the all-purpose 
means of action are prerequisites for whole categories of human action, their 
availability contributes more to one's ability to fulfill unpredictable future duties 
than any specific resource. Of course, the loss of a specific resource could interfere
with one's fulfillment of a known obligation. Losing a sum of money earmarked 
for a particular purpose might prevent one from fulfilling a promise, for instance. 
But the loss of a specific sum of money does not make whole categories of human 
action impossible, so a financial loss interferes less than does confinement with 
one's ability to fulfill the unpredicted and unpredictable demands of morality.
The rational and moral duty to preserve one’s all-purpose means explains 
the wrongness of most instances of kidnapping. I cannot rationally endorse 
someone else kidnapping me to fulfill a desire I have no duty to help fulfill. I thus 
cannot endorse ethical norms that permit people to kidnap others whenever doing
so advances their interests. Thus, on the Kantian view of morality, kidnapping 
others to advance one’s interests is wrong.
III. From Kidnapping to Imprisonment
Of course, there are morally salient differences between kidnapping by private 
citizens and the imprisonment of accused and convicted criminals by the state. 
Nonetheless, the Kantian argument against kidnapping extends to some (but not 
all) uses of imprisonment by the state. This section will explain three ways in 
which the reasoning of the argument against kidnapping can be extended. First, 
the argument against kidnapping applies to agents of the state. One might think 
that the principles of just or legitimate state action differ from the ethical 
principles that apply to individual action. The state is entitled to do many things 
that individuals are not entitled to do. Why not think that the ethical principles 
regulating just imprisonment by the state differ from the ethical principles 
regarding kidnapping by private citizens, just as the ethical principles regulating 
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just seizures of property by the state differ from the ethical principles regarding 
stealing?
If the above arguments for duties to respect individual agency are correct, 
however, these duties apply to state actors. Nothing about these arguments limits 
their application to the action of private individuals. For the same reason it is 
wrong for an individual to kill in order to satisfy her own her own mere desire, it 
is wrong for a state actor to kill as a means of satisfying the mere desires of the 
many. Someone who endorses ethical norms authorizing agents of the state to kill
as a means of satisfying public preferences might thereby endorse the destruction 
of her own agency. Likewise, it is wrong for the state to incarcerate innocent 
citizens as a means of satisfying public preferences. Someone who endorses 
ethical norms authorizing agents of the state to imprison citizens for the sake of 
satisfying public preferences might thereby endorse her own incarceration.
Though the primary argument against kidnapping for the sake of 
preference-satisfaction applies equally to private individuals and to the state, 
there are additional constraints on uses of imprisonment by private individuals. 
For example, the state can provide a form of due process that private citizens 
cannot. So it may turn out that there are some ends (other than preference-
satisfaction) that justify incarceration by the state but that do not justify private 
citizens in using force against each other.
This raises the question whether the argument against kidnapping can be 
extended in a second way. Does the argument against confining people to satisfy 
private desires or public preferences also prohibit confining people to achieve 
better ends than mere preference-satisfaction? For the moment, consider only 
confinement of people not convicted or suspected of crimes. The Kantian 
explanation for the wrongness of kidnapping implies that it is morally acceptable 
to confine innocent people only if those people could rationally and morally 
endorse their own confinement. People can rationally and morally endorse their 
own confinement only if doing so would be consistent with their other duties. 
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Since people have a duty to prepare to fulfill unpredictable future duties, and 
because freedom of movement is one of the central, all-purpose means of human 
action, people have a pro tanto duty not to endorse their own confinement. 
Normally, the fact that an act would bring about a good result does not, by itself, 
justify violating a pro tanto moral duty. Only a weightier or higher-priority moral 
duty can justify violating a pro tanto moral duty. It is thus wrong to imprison 
innocent people unless these people have an important moral duty that their 
confinement would help to fulfill.
Quarantine of people with highly infectious and dangerous diseases is 
justified, on this account. People have a moral duty to avoid endangering others’ 
lives. If one has a highly infectious, dangerous disease, going into quarantine 
would help to fulfill this duty. By contrast, it is wrong knowingly to incarcerate an
innocent person as a scapegoat in order to calm a restive population. Calming a 
restive population is a good thing, but individuals do not have a moral duty to 
submit to incarceration in order to calm a restive population. The duty to preserve
one’s own effective agency and to prepare to fulfill future duties has more weight.
On a Kantian picture of morality, a duty to address a grave threat to someone’s 
agency (e.g. a threat to life) is the only duty that can outweigh the duty to 
preserve the effectiveness of one’s own agency. Thus, imprisoning the innocent is 
justified only if it addresses a grave threat to someone’s agency.
The third extension of the argument against kidnapping concerns respect 
for the agency of the guilty. Thus far, I have argued that it is wrong to confine 
innocent people as a means to any end other than protecting people’s agency. But 
when government imprisons convicts, thereby depriving them of one of the 
central means of human agency, typically it imprisons people who are not 
innocent. When is it permissible to undermine the effective agency of someone 
who has done a legal or moral wrong in the past?
It is intuitively obvious that criminals retain some of their rights—
including, at least, their right not to be kidnapped by private persons for reasons 
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unrelated to their crimes (Quinn 1985). One might worry that the earlier Kantian 
reasoning is unable to explain this. According to that line of reasoning, I cannot 
endorse ethical norms that condone interference with the agency of the innocent, 
since I might thereby endorse interference with my own agency. Since my actions 
are in my own control, however, I can guarantee that I will always be an innocent
person. If I endorse ethical norms that permit interference with the agency of the 
guilty, I would not thereby endorse interference with my own agency.
But it would be hubris for me to think I can guarantee that I will never, at 
any point in the future, commit a wrong. Human beings are flawed. Only a 
conceited, deluded person could think that he could guarantee he will never do 
anything morally wrong. It would also be hubris to think one will never break the 
law. Perhaps someone could know that because of way her character is 
constituted, there are specific crimes or types of wrongdoing that she is extremely 
unlikely ever to commit. But this knowledge would not license endorsing ethical 
norms that permit undermining the agency of people who commit those specific 
crimes or wrongs. The rational acceptability of ethical norms does not depend on 
knowledge of the peculiarities of one’s own character and situation. A sound 
system of ethical norms must be acceptable to all flawed human beings, not only 
to those who have certain flaws and lack others.
As flawed rational agents, we are rationally committed to remaining 
effective agents and to being able to carry out our moral duties and obligations, 
even after having done a wrong. An agent’s rational commitment to the 
preservation of the effectiveness of her own agency does not depend on moral 
desert. All human rational agents are committed to preserving their freedom of 
movement, since any of us could, in the future, have duties that can only be 
fulfilled by moving freely. In thinking about what ethical norms are acceptable, 
then, we must consider the possibility that we will ourselves do wrong, and that 
we remain committed to the importance of our effective agency if we do.
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Properly understood, then, the Kantian argument against kidnapping 
implies that the mere fact that someone has committed a moral or legal wrong in 
the past has no bearing on the permissibility of confining that person. There is a 
separate question whether one may confine a person or threaten to confine a 
person to prevent that person from committing a wrong or a legal offense. This is 
a special case of the general question when defensive force is justified. It is easy to
see why it is permissible to use force that stops a wrongful attack without doing 
anything to undermine the attacker’s future agency (e.g. blocking a punch). It is 
harder to see why it is permissible to use defensive force that has long-term 
effects on an attacker’s agency (e.g. killing or injuring an attacker in self-defense).
Appealing to a distinction between intended and merely foreseen harms will not 
do. When someone kills in self-defense, the death of the attacker is usually the 
means of stopping the attack; it is not merely a foreseen, unintended side-effect of
stopping the attack.
Here is one possible explanation why defensive force is permissible even if 
it undermines the agency of the attacker in a way that goes beyond blocking the 
attack. When defensive force is proportional to the gravity of a wrongful attack—
when impairment of the attacker’s agency is no greater than the impairment the 
attack would have done to the victim’s agency had it succeeded—defensive force 
shifts the costs of a moral failure from the victim to the wrongdoer. Flawed 
rational agents who know that they could become attackers, but who also know 
that they could be victims, have no objection to ethical norms that permit the 
costs of their own errors to be shifted onto them. Though everyone is rationally 
committed to valuing his own agency, no one is rationally or morally entitled to 
value his own agency more highly than the agency of others. So attackers and 
potential attackers have no objection to defensive force that is proportional to the 
gravity of a wrongful attack. Defensive force that undermines the attacker’s 
agency is only justified in response to an attack that could wrongly interfere with 
someone’s agency, however. If an action is wrongful in some other way, defensive
13
force cannot be justified as shifting the harm to agency from the would-be victim 
to the attacker. For example, it is wrong to use force to stop actions that are 
disrespectful but not injurious.
IV. Justifying Imprisonment
I have argued that if we understand the wrong of kidnapping correctly, we will 
see that there is a broader moral duty to respect agency which prohibits confining 
people against their will in many circumstances. The only exceptions to this 
prohibition on involuntary confinement involve the protection of agency. It may 
be acceptable to confine innocent people against their will to prevent serious 
harm to someone's agency (e.g., death from disease). It may be acceptable to use 
or to threaten confinement as a means of defense against present or future 
wrongdoing—but only if the wrongdoing would threaten either people’s agency 
itself or their effective access to one of the all-purpose means of agency. This 
section will defend some moral limits on the use of incarceration that follow from 
these principles. To do so, it will examine the extent to which any of three most 
influential justifications of punishment—retribution, moral education, and 
deterrence—can overcome the moral presumption against involuntary 
confinement.
The ethical principles concerning restriction of agency do not admit 
retribution as a justification of imprisonment. As flawed rational agents, we are all
rationally committed to the preservation of our agency, and this commitment is 
not conditional on any assessment of the merits of our past actions. We are also 
rationally committed to the availability of all-purpose means, such as freedom of 
movement, to help us satisfy unpredictable future moral duties and obligations. 
We could not rationally consent to ethical norms that allowed people (including 
state actors) to undermine or to threaten other people’s agency as a backward-
looking remedy for a past wrong. Nor could we rationally consent to ethical 
norms that allowed people to deprive others of all-purpose means of agency as a 
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backward-looking remedy. Only the hope of protecting or promoting someone’s 
present or future agency or their access to all-purpose means can justify 
imprisonment in any form. This does not imply that there is anything wrong with 
retributive theories of punishment. It only implies that retributive theories of 
punishment cannot support incarceration as a punishment.
One might try to argue that punishing people for their past wrongs is a way
of respecting their agency. Kant's own theory of punishment could be interpreted 
as taking this position. We respect a thief's misguided exercise of agency by 
imposing on the thief the form of insecurity that the thief's maxim of action would
have imposed on everyone (Kant 1796: 474, Ak. 6:333). But it is not plausible to 
think both that we have a duty to respect criminals' mistaken exercises of agency 
by imposing penalties and that this duty outweighs our duty not to prevent 
criminals from fulfilling future duties.
Moral education theories of punishment, by contrast, may provide broad 
support for the use of imprisonment as a punishment. Imprisonment may be 
morally permissible when its use enhances prisoners’ effective rational agency 
overall, even though it undermines or threatens the conditions of rational agency 
temporarily. Assuming that citizens are morally required to refrain from doing all 
the things that criminal statutes prohibit, citizens who violate criminal statutes 
display a defect in their rational agency. Imprisonment as a punishment could 
enhance these citizens’ rational agency if it helps them to understand the moral 
reasons to refrain from crime and to be motivated by these reasons in the future.
Punishment could contribute to moral learning in two ways. On 
communicative models of moral education through punishment, the fact of 
punishment itself expresses a message with moral content to the convicted 
criminal (Hampton 1984; McTaggart 1896; Morris 1981).8 It could communicate, 
for instance, that we collectively reject the conduct for which the convict is being 
punished. On a treatment of model of moral education, punishment is organized 
so that the experience of punishment contributes to moral learning. The 
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experience of hard treatment could be intended to give convicts empathy for the 
suffering of their victims. Or convicts could be put in an environment that is 
designed to help develop habits of moral behavior.
Moral education theories have an important limitation as a justification for 
imprisonment. A moral education theory of punishment only justifies 
imprisonment if there is positive evidence that the form of imprisonment used or 
threatened actually does educate. To justify a limitation of agency that would 
ordinarily be wrong, it is not enough to speculate that this limitation could lead to 
an overall enhancement of the restricted person’s agency. It is necessary to have 
empirical evidence that temporarily limiting a person’s agency is likely to have an 
educational effect. In assessing the educational effects of imprisonment, one must 
keep in mind that punishment succeeds at moral education only if the person 
being punished comes to recognize the moral reasons to behave better. If all that 
a punished person learns is that a certain behavior leads to aversive consequences,
moral education has not taken place, and the agency of the punished person has 
not been enhanced. So evidence that imprisonment improves convicts’ behavior 
after release is not sufficient to show that prison is an effective form of moral 
education, since the improvement could be a result either of moral education or 
of specific deterrence.
If evidence that imprisonment morally educates is not forthcoming, the 
only justification of imprisonment as a punishment would be collective defense. 
The principle of justified defensive force permits acts that undermine someone’s 
agency as a means of preventing that person from wrongfully undermining 
another person’s agency. Justified defensive force is limited to actions that are 
necessary to prevent wrongful acts and proportional to the harm to agency that 
the would-be wrongdoer threatens. For the defensive principle to authorize 
imprisonment as punishment, the explanation how imprisonment contributes to 
the defense of agency would have to be indirect. Imprisonment as a punishment 
does not aim to prevent a convict from committing a specific wrong against a 
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specific potential victim. One possible line of argument is that the threat of 
imprisonment serves to protect citizens generally against wrongful violence.
Warren Quinn’s theory of punishment could be used to produce a 
justification along these lines for imprisonment of violent offenders (Quinn 
1985).9 In many contexts, it is not possible to prevent wrongful violence by 
directly using force against the attacker, but it is possible to prevent wrongful 
violence by making a sincere and credible threat to harm the attacker in the 
future if the attack continues. If the attacker does not have a legitimate complaint 
against the immediate use of defensive violence, the attacker does not have a 
legitimate complaint against issuing a sincere threat of future harm that is no 
more serious than defensive harm that would be justifiable in the present 
moment. Threatening a term of imprisonment would be threatening a less serious 
harm than death or serious bodily injury, both of which are permissible defensive 
responses to attempted murder or mayhem. If it is not wrong for the legislature to
make this threat credibly and sincerely to would-be violent criminals throughout 
the population, it is not wrong for government to carry out the threat against 
people who commit wrongful violence in defiance of the legislature's threat.
This account may be vulnerable to objections, either as an account of 
punishment in general or as an account of justified imprisonment. My aim here is 
not to defend Quinn’s account, but to point to two limitations that result from the 
account’s reliance on the defensive principle. First, imprisonment may only be 
used as a punishment for intentional violations of laws that are needed to protect 
either agency itself (e.g. protections of life and bodily integrity) or the availability 
of all-purpose means of agency (e.g. basic liberties, the opportunity to have 
property). These may include laws that are indirectly necessary to protect citizens’
agency. Since some of the all-purpose means of agency, such as property, only 
exist in a civil condition, imprisonment may be used to enforce laws that are 
strictly necessary to the operation of a minimally functional state, such as tax laws
and laws against bribery, election fraud, and treason. But it would be a mistake to
17
that the state’s ability to protect citizens’ effective agency requires general 
compliance with every justified regulation the state issues. Rational agency can 
flourish despite widespread disobedience of laws that are inessential to its 
protection. 
Collective defense accounts of punishment impose a further limitation on 
imprisonment in law enforcement: the use or threat of imprisonment to enforce a 
given law must be proportionate to the threat to agency that violations of this law 
pose. The threat to imprison people for serious crimes of violence would be 
proportionate to the threat that such crimes pose to individual victims' agency. 
Whether imprisonment may be used to enforce property laws is less 
straightforward. Theft undermines one of the victim's all-purpose means of 
agency, namely the opportunity to have property. One small theft, or one large 
theft from a well-off person, does not constitute a great enough interference with 
the victim's property for imprisonment to be a proportionate response. 
Widespread theft, however, would seriously threaten everyone's ability to control 
property. Perhaps it could even undermine a society’s economic system in a way 
that threatens everyone's ability to sustain themselves. One might argue that 
because widespread theft, even widespread petty theft, would seriously threaten 
citizens’ effective agency, the legislature is justified in sincerely threatening 
everyone with incarceration if they engage in theft.  
Even if there is a sound argument for imprisonment as a punishment for 
theft, defense of citizens' agency cannot justify the use of imprisonment to enforce
every justified criminal prohibition. Some justified criminal laws protect only an 
aspect of one of the all-purpose means of agency. Consider laws against simple 
trespass. Though widespread violation of laws against simple trespass would 
undermine an aspect of one of the all-purpose means of agency, the ability to 
have and to control property, it would not deprive people of effective property 
rights altogether. Since imprisonment deprives people of freedom of movement 
entirely, the threat of imprisonment is not a proportionate defensive response to 
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the crime of simple trespass. Other justified criminal laws do not protect people's 
agency at all; they protect people's welfare.  For example, laws against disorderly 
conduct are justified, but since many forms of disorderly conduct do not threaten 
anyone's agency—they only interfere with people's welfare—laws against 
disorderly conduct should not be enforced using the threat of imprisonment.
Though many of the laws that should not be enforced via imprisonment 
concern minor crimes, some laws should not be enforced via imprisonment even 
though they concern serious forms of wrongdoing. Consider laws against insider 
trading. Though there is debate about whether insider trading is wrong, there are 
reasons to regard it as a form of fraud or deception that is seriously wrong. On the
“traditional theory,” insider trading by executives of the firm whose stock is 
traded violates a fiduciary duty to shareholders. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 
U.S. 642, 651 (1997). Another theory holds that insider trading involves a 
misappropriation of information and thereby violates a duty of trust owed to the 
source of information. Id. at 652. Still a third theory holds that insider trading 
involves deception of the investors with whom one is trading. If one has an 
informational advantage to which one is not entitled, it is deceptive to use this 
advantage in trading; one should either disclose what one knows before trading 
or refrain from trading on the information (Strudler and Orts 1999; Strudler 
2009). Though insider trading is arguably seriously wrong, and though it does 
real harm to investors who are not insiders, the harm is typically diffuse. Rarely, if
ever, do individual victims suffer losses great enough that the victim is altogether 
deprived of the effective right to possess financial resources. The harm that 
widespread insider trading would do is unlikely to undermine the economic 
system in a way that threatens people's effective agency. Indeed, some have 
argued that the practice of insider trading can contribute to economic efficiency 
by spreading information about the appropriate valuation of securities (Ma and 
Sun 1998) or by providing an incentive for entrepreneurship (Manne 1966), 
though others doubt that insider trading promotes efficiency (Werhane 1989). So 
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a collective defense theory of imprisonment cannot justify the threat of 
imprisonment as a punishment for insider trading. Insider trading may be a 
serious crime that deserves serious punishment, but moral desert alone cannot 
justify incarceration.
V. Conclusion
Many governments use imprisonment to enforce a wide variety of criminal laws, 
but government’s entitlement to make criminal laws quite possibly exceeds its 
entitlement to use imprisonment as an enforcement mechanism. Imprisonment 
affects people’s agency in distinctive ways that are difficult to justify. The only 
possible justifications for imprisonment in law enforcement are moral education 
and collective defense. Collective defense may justify the use of imprisonment to 
punish violent crimes and other crimes that attack people’s ability to exercise 
agency effectively. It does not justify the use of imprisonment to enforce all 
justified criminal laws. Moral education theories of punishment may justify a 
broader use of imprisonment as punishment, but only if there is positive evidence 
(not mere speculation or hope) that imprisonment helps people to recognize the 
moral reasons to do what the law says. The question whether any actual system of
incarceration has this effect I must leave to readers’ judgment.10
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1 For discussion of the penal reform movement on the right, see Dagan and Teles 2012.
2 I do not count laws against drug possession and trafficking as examples because there is 
controversy about whether criminal law should regulate recreational drugs at all.
3 Though I use a Kantian ethical framework, I will not attempt either to interpret or to 
defend Kant's opaque discussion of criminal punishment in the Doctrine of Right.
4 Barbara Herman identifies three central means of human agency: skills, things, and the 
help of others (Herman 1984: 585). I suggest here that movement, including free 
locomotion, should be added to this list.
5 In Rawlsian terms, loss of freedom limits a person’s ability to revise and pursue a 
conception of the good. John Rawls added freedom of movement to his list of primary 
goods, aptly but without explanation, in Political Liberalism (Rawls 2005: 181).
6 This is why Kant believes that it is immoral to neglect the development of one’s talents 
(Kant 1785: 74-75, Ak. 4:423).
7 This is why Kant believes that it is immoral to have a policy of never helping anyone (Kant 
1785: 75, Ak. 4:423)
8 None of these theories is intended to justify imprisonment in particular. Jean Hampton 
explicitly states that her theory “rejects many forms of incarceration used today.” (Hampton
1984: 228).
9 On Sharon Byrd’s interpretation of Kant’s cryptic remarks about punishment, Kant’s own 
theory of punishment has a somewhat similar structure (Byrd 1989). 
10 I am grateful to Barbara Herman, Herbert Morris, Stephen Munzer, Seana Valentine 
Shiffrin, Alan Strudler, and the members of the UCLA Ethics Writing Seminar, the UCLA 
Legal Theory Workshop, the Wharton LGST junior faculty workshop, an audience at IRV 
2015, and the workshop on incarceration at the University of New Orleans for helpful 
comments on previous drafts.
